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Abstract 
We recently reported a study (Warneken & Rosati, 2015) examining whether 
chimpanzees possess several cognitive capacities that are critical to engage in cooking. In 
a subsequent commentary, Beran and colleagues (2015) asserted that our paper has 
several flaws. Their commentary (1) critiques some aspects of our methodology, and 
argues that our work does not constitute evidence that chimpanzees can actually cook; (2) 
claims that these results are old news, as previous work had already demonstrated that 
chimpanzees possess most or all of these capacities; and finally (3) argues that 
comparative psychological studies of chimpanzees cannot adequately address questions 
about human evolution anyway. However, their critique of the premise of our study 
simply reiterates several points we made in the original paper. To quote ourselves: “As 
chimpanzees neither control fire nor cook food in their natural behavior, these 
experiments therefore focus not on whether chimpanzees can actually cook food, but 
rather whether they can apply their cognitive skills to novel problems that emulate 
cooking” (Warneken & Rosati, 2015, page 2). Furthermore, the methodological issues 
they raise are standard points about psychological research with animals—many of which 
were addressed synthetically across our nine experiments, or else are orthogonal to our 
claims. Finally, we argue that comparative studies of extant apes (and other nonhuman 
species) are a powerful and indispensable method for understanding human cognitive 
evolution.  
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The rationale of our study 
The context of our study is a debate about the origins of cooking in human 
evolution. In particular, a recent hypothesis (Wrangham, 2009; Wrangham, Jones, Laden, 
Pilbeam, & Conklin-Brittain, 1999) proposes that the shift to a cooked diet occurred 
fairly early, and played a significant role in shaping the evolution of significant human 
traits such as large brains. Testing this hypothesis therefore hinges on dating the 
emergence of cooking. Previous work has examined this question from the perspective of 
archaeological or fossil evidence. Yet the archaeological record for hearths and burned 
material is fragile and may degrade, so there are disagreements concerning earliest 
evidence for the control of fire (e.g., Berna et al., 2012; Gowlett & Wrangham, 2013; 
Roebroeks & Villa, 2011). Moreover, fire can also be used for warmth, light, and 
protection (Bellomo, 1994; Burton, 2009), so even strong evidence for fire control might 
not necessarily reflect the emergence of cooking. Shifts towards a cooked diet might be 
reflected by morphological reductions in teeth or gut size (Organ, Nunn, Machanda, & 
Wrangham, 2011; Wrangham, 2009), but this fossil evidence could also reflect increased 
consumption of other softer or higher-quality foods (Aiello & Wheeler, 1995; Teaford & 
Ungar, 2000; Ungar, Grine, & Teaford, 2006).  
We therefore proposed that comparative psychological studies could provide a 
third window into the origins of cooking. As cooking behaviors require multiple 
cognitive skills (beyond the control of fire), studies of the psychological capacities in 
other species—especially chimpanzees, as one of our closest living relatives—can 
provide a valuable test case for how rapidly the control of fire may have led to the 
adoption of cooking. We used an analytical approach and broke cooking down into a set 
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of constituent skills that we argued are necessary pre-requisites for this behavior. We then 
systematically tested these skills across nine experiments that built in complexity while 
targeting different components. For example, our experiments initially confirmed that 
chimpanzees selected cooked food over a raw alternative when faced with a dichotomous 
choice (Experiments 1 and 5a: potatoes; Experiments 6a: carrots). Another study 
presented chimpanzees with a choice between one raw piece of food they could have 
immediately, or three pieces they could obtain only after a one-minute delay; the critical 
comparison was how chimpanzees responded when this larger reward was raw versus 
cooked across conditions. We found that chimpanzees were more willing to wait for the 
delayed food when it was cooked than raw, indicating that they would pay some 
additional temporal cost to acquire it (Experiment 2). The majority of our tasks 
(Experiments 3-9) then involved two novel devices: a cooking device that appeared to 
transform raw food into cooked food when food was placed inside and the device was 
shaken, and a control device that could be manipulated in the same way but did not 
transform raw food. We used these devices—rather than “real” cooking, such as with a 
fire—for both pragmatic safety reasons, but also to test chimpanzees on a novel problem 
emulating cooking that they could never have seen before.  
Using this basic setup, we probed how chimpanzees understood these devices. 
First, we found that chimpanzees preferred the cooking device over the control device 
after seeing both baited with raw food and manipulated, but not yet opened to reveal their 
contents (Experiments 3 and 5b). Second, when directly given raw food, chimpanzees 
chose to actively place it in the cooking device in order to acquire cooked food, rather 
than eat the food already in their possession or place it in the control device that did not 
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alter it (Experiments 4 and 5c). Third, chimpanzees flexibly modulated what they put in 
this device: they placed both familiar and novel raw foods inside (carrots, which the 
chimpanzees had never observed with the devices) rather than placing them in the control 
device, but directly ate pre-cooked foods (cooked potato) that did not need to be 
transformed in this way (Experiment 6b). Fourth, when given both a slice of raw potato 
and a visually similar but inedible item (a wood chip) at the same time, they selectively 
chose to place the edible item inside the cooking device, but did not attempt to place the 
wood chip or both options inside—even though this would have increased their total food 
rewards (Experiment 7). That is, chimpanzees did not merely think something superior 
came out of the cooking device whenever they placed something inside, as they refrained 
from putting in nonfood items. Fifth, they exhibited additional self-control capacities by 
transporting raw food across a room, paying some additional energetic and temporal costs 
to place it in the cooking device (Experiment 8). Finally, to a more limited degree they 
saved raw food for three minutes in anticipation of future opportunities to place it in the 
cooking device (which was not present at the time), but ate the entire allotment of raw 
food in a control condition where there were no such opportunities (Experiment 9).  
Based on this whole sequence of experiments, we argued that chimpanzees show 
several of the psychological capacities that are necessary to cook food: motivation or 
desire to pursue cooked food; patience to wait temporal delays to acquire cooked foods as 
well as pay some additional energetic cost to transport food so it would be cooked; the 
self-control to give up food in one’s hand to have it be cooked; a basic causal 
comprehension of how these devices transformed raw foods after little experience; and 
finally the ability to save raw food for future cooking opportunities. We then reflected on 
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additional technological, social, and ecological factors that may have been necessary for 
cooking behaviors to actually emerge in the hominin lineage. In particular, we 
highlighted the need for control of fire; increased inter-individual tolerance due to the 
risk of theft posed by the cooking process given that many apes are quite competitive for 
food; and a shift to a diet including more starchy tubers (which are profoundly 
transformed by cooking, unlike the fruit staples of chimpanzee diets). That is to say, 
while we proposed and tested for several psychological skills that we think are necessary 
pre-requisites for cooking, we also indicated that this list was unlikely to be exhaustive 
given that chimpanzees do not in fact cook food. 
 
Critique 1: Are these methodologies appropriate? 
Many aspects of Beran et al.’s commentary focus on whether our methods could 
assess whether chimpanzees possess “conceptual knowledge” of cooking (Beran et al., 
2015, page 1). For example, their commentary analogizes our cooking devices to a 
microwave: chimpanzees may understand that they can put a raw slice of potato in and 
get a cooked slice out, but not anything deeper about the underlying physical 
transformation. Beran et al. contest our claims about chimpanzees’ competence because 
our setup did not require “any knowledge about why a better food emerged” (Beran et al., 
2015, p. 2) or that shorter cooking periods result in undercooked food and long cooking 
periods may burn the potatoes  (Beran et al., 2015, p. 3). We agree that it may very well 
be the case that chimpanzees treated our cooking device how humans use a microwave, 
but disagree that this proposal affects our main conclusions. At the heart of this debate is 
what abilities an organism (human or otherwise) actually has to have in order to cook 
	 7 
foods. To our knowledge, there is no overarching theory that specifies the necessary and 
sufficient behavioral skills for organisms to cook. Therefore, our approach was to suggest 
and test for basic cognitive and behavioral skills whose absence would preclude cooking 
behaviors.  For example, an individual would need to be willing to wait some temporal 
duration in order to cook food, as cooking inherently takes some time—without 
necessarily understanding thermodynamics. Similarly, an individual would have to 
understand that their cooking behavior turns raw food into cooked food (whether this is 
by placing food into a fire, or inside a microwave), without necessarily knowing how or 
why this happens chemically. We therefore argued that our results suggest that 
chimpanzees had “a practical understanding of this basic cooking transformation after 
minimal experience” (Warneken & Rosati, 2015, page 8; emphasis added). Thus, the 
premise of our work was not that chimpanzees would have evolved “conceptual 
knowledge” of cooking—which would be a rather odd claim given that chimpanzees do 
not naturally cook. Rather, we argued that many of the skills needed for cooking are 
domain-general capacities, likely utilized in other contexts such as foraging, which could 
be applied to the problems posed by cooking. Thus, we agree that in effect we presented 
the chimpanzees with an artificial microwave paradigm, but believe that this situation 
actually captures many critical behavioral dimensions of cooking.  
Another major point in Beran et al.’s commentary is that many of our results 
might stem from of associative learning. Specifically, they propose that “chimpanzees 
associated, through experience and learning, one container with the more-preferred 
cooked potato, and one with the less-preferred raw potato, and they chose the container 
associated with the more-preferred food” (Beran et al., 2015, page 2). We agree that it is 
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obvious that some form of learning must account for the chimpanzees’ responses across 
our tasks, as we designed the studies to involve an entirely new problem vis-à-vis the 
novel cooking and control devices. The main question at stake is: Does it challenge our 
claim that chimpanzees’ possess critical capacities for cooking if the chimpanzees’ 
responses stemmed from associative learning mechanisms? We think it does not. By 
whatever means, chimpanzees have some psychological machinery that is sufficiently 
complex for them to quickly learn cooking-relevant skills. So, even if we were wrong in 
the specific inferential capacities we attribute to chimpanzees, this alternative does not 
affect our main conclusion concerning their ability to solve several problems that emulate 
cooking.  
Nonetheless, Beran and colleagues (2015) think our specific claims about the 
underlying psychology are wrong, and present their alternative as a deflationary account. 
Yet we find the commentary’s particular associative learning account to be implausible. 
Their proposed association of the cooking device with preferred cooked potatoes might at 
best explain why the chimpanzees chose to retrieve food from the cooking device over 
the control device (Experiment 3). But, it is unclear how this could account for the fact 
that chimpanzees also opted to actively place their own food inside the cooking device 
(Experiments 4-9), or even save food for the future when no cooking device was even 
present at the time (Experiment 9). These responses require the self-control to give up 
food in their hand—not just to associate the cooking device with preferred food—as well 
as additional inferential steps as to the outcomes of their actions. Moreover, this scenario 
is not compatible with the fact that the chimpanzees learned these responses rapidly and 
then flexibly deployed their new knowledge. For example, the chimpanzees did not 
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blindly place any item in the cooking device under the assumption that a good food item 
would pop out: they selectively placed familiar and novel raw foods inside, but choose to 
eat pre-cooked food and ignore inedible items (Experiments 6b and 7). In total, our 
results are not compatible with the particular associative learning account described by 
Beran and colleagues. 
Other methodological critiques of specific experiments in our paper seem 
unfounded. For example, the commentary argues that it is difficult for nonhuman 
primates to inhibit pointing to larger amounts of food in their critique of Experiment 2 on 
temporal discounting, yet this study contrasted two conditions that both involved a choice 
between a smaller, immediate reward (raw in both conditions) and a larger reward that 
required a 1 min wait (raw or cooked, across conditions). Given that this potential 
‘pointing’ issue would then apply to both conditions, it is unclear how it can account for 
the chimpanzees’ differential willingness to wait for cooked foods. Moreover, other 
species do show preferences for the smaller, immediate reward in intertemporal choice 
tasks when the larger reward is delayed for even for short periods on the order of 10-20s 
(Stevens & Stephens, 2008). This includes cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus), 
marmosets (Callithrix jacchus), and several lemur species tested in quite similar contexts 
with visible food rewards (Stevens, Hallinan, & Hauser, 2005; Stevens & Muhlhoff, 
2012). Given that great apes show much more robust inhibitory control over pre-potent 
reaching responses compared to other primates (see Maclean et al., 2014 for a large 
cross-species comparison), it is difficult to see how this pointing explanation could 
account for this complete set of results. Similarly, Beran et al. write that chimpanzees’ 
placing of raw food items into the cooking device might reflect trading behavior, similar 
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to previous studies (e.g., Dufour, Pelé, Sterck, & Thierry, 2007). Yet as we pointed out in 
our original paper, such previous studies involved extensive initial shaping of this trading 
behavior, and the chimpanzees in our study did not experience such training—nor other 
relevant learning experiences, such as in the use of tokens. Moreover, our experiments 
testing whether this behavior transfers to other food items but not non-food items directly 
addressed this trading-hypothesis, as discussed below. 
The commentary also raises the specter of potential social cuing in our studies. 
This is a common issue in comparative research involving human experimenters, and we 
took the standard approach for dealing with it: the experimenter looked down or along the 
table’s midline to avoid inadvertent cues when the ape was responding (Warneken & 
Rosati, 2015, page 3). Yet in general, over two decades of research has shown that apes 
are not very successful at using even highly salient human social cues to locate hidden 
food—including directed gaze, pointing, or placing physical markers on containers (see 
Hare, 2011; Tomasello, Call, & Hare, 2003a for reviews). Chimpanzees can certainly use 
social cues in some contexts more successfully than others: they are more successful at 
interpreting a human competitor reaching for a piece of hidden food compared to a 
human cooperatively pointing at its location (Hare & Tomasello, 2004), and can learn to 
use humans points to identify which tube to place an object in following extensive 
training with this trading procedure (Hopkins, Russell, McIntyre, & Leavens, 2013). 
Overall, however, they have at best a fragile ability to use even clearly visible and 
intentional human social cues in the absence of training (see Rosati, Santos, & Hare, 
2010 for a review). While it is of course important to be vigilant to the possibility 
inadvertent social cuing, there is no actual evidence of chimpanzees using subtle cues that 
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the human actor did not actually intend to produce. Most importantly from our 
perspective, evidence for social cue use comes primarily from situations where animals 
have to make a choice by reaching or pointing to one of two options, but we only used 
this method for the first three experiments in our paper. There is no evidence that an 
human cue could cause an animal to spontaneously give up food they already possess, the 
primary method we used in Experiments 4-9 involving the cooking device. In Experiment 
9 there was not even a human around to produce such an inadvertent social cue, as that 
study examined the chimpanzees’ ability to save the food for the future in the absence of 
concurrent cues that cooking was possible such as the experimenter or the devices.  
Finally, we must point out that Beran and colleagues’ approach in their 
commentary is to suggest alternative explanations for each individual experiment in our 
paper, rather than consider the entire weight of the evidence. It is certainly important to 
identify what questions individual studies leave unanswered. However, it is curious that 
several of their concerns simply re-state comments we made in our original paper, 
without considering how subsequent experiments were explicitly designed to address 
these outstanding questions. For example, we first suggested that chimpanzees might 
have learned to trade raw potato for cooked potato (in Experiments 4 and 5), but we then 
went on to test whether this was the case (in Experiments 6 and 7). In fact, chimpanzee 
neither placed only raw potato into the cooking device (a narrow ‘trading’ interpretation), 
nor optimistically placed any item into it (a broader interpretation). Rather, they flexibly 
and selectively shifted their behavior to place both familiar and novel raw items, but not 
pre-cooked or inedible items. We think this issue speaks to how converging evidence can 
be used to evaluate alternative explanations for the mechanisms underlying behavior. 
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Indeed, similar discussions about how ad hoc alternatives for specific results can be ruled 
out have occurred for other domains in comparative psychology (for example, see Call & 
Tomasello, 2008; Povinelli & Vonk, 2003; Tomasello et al., 2003a; Tomasello, Call, & 
Hare, 2003b for a debate about chimpanzees' ability to engage in visual perspective-
taking, where interpretations based on narrow behavior-reading rules might possibly 
account for some results, but do not apply to other findings). Of course the results from 
any one experiment may have multiple interpretations—the key is whether those 
interpretations hold up across all the evidence. In this case, it does not. 
 
Critique 2: This is all old news 
The second major point made in Beran and colleagues’ commentary is that our 
findings are not actually novel. They argue that previous studies have already 
demonstrated that chimpanzees show causal reasoning, can delay gratification, or plan for 
the future. We think that this comment is problematic in at least two ways. The first 
concerns the goal of (comparative) psychological research. In our opinion, we should not 
just aim to check off whether a certain cognitive ability is present or absent in a particular 
species—it is also critical to assess how and when these cognitive abilities are actually 
used across different contexts. Even if component abilities are present in a certain 
organism (in that they show them in some situations), it does not necessarily follow that 
they apply these skills to all situations or can integrate them with other relevant skills to 
perform a complex behavior. In fact, several theories from cognitive development (Carey, 
2004), cognitive neuroscience (Buckner & Krienen, 2013), and comparative cognition 
(Shettleworth, 2012) assert that unique components of human cognition may in a large 
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part be due to novel connections between different cognitive abilities. That is, nonhumans 
might have many or all the relevant constituent parts seen in humans, but cannot integrate 
these skills in the way necessary to give rise to novel, human-specific behaviors (e.g., 
Spelke & Kinzler, 2007; Wang & Spelke, 2002).  
The second problem of this critique pertains to the goals and claims of our study 
in particular. Our paper acknowledged that many of our target cognitive skills have been 
the focus of (sometimes extensive) research in comparative psychology. In particular, we 
emphasized that cognitive abilities such as temporal discounting, self-control, causal 
reasoning, and future planning may be domain-general capacities that chimpanzees can 
apply across different contexts: “the cognitive skills we explore are not necessarily 
specific to [cooking]” (Warneken & Rosati, 2015, page 2). For example, many 
researchers have examined temporal discounting (see Stevens & Stephens, 2008 for a 
review) or future planning  in primates, birds, and other species (see Clayton, Bussey, & 
Dickinson, 2003; Mulcahy & Call, 2006; Osvath & Martin-Ordas, 2014). Yet we would 
be quite surprised to learn there was already consensus that chimpanzees (or any other 
nonhuman) can use them for cooking in particular. The fact that many of our target 
cognitive skills are of great interest to comparative psychologists does not mean that 
previous work made any connection to cooking. As a matter of fact, these prior studies 
did not even raise the question what abilities may underlie cooking behaviors.  
To our knowledge, the only previous study targeting the psychological skills 
supporting cooking behaviors comes from a paper by Wobber and colleagues (2008), 
showing that all four great ape species preferred a variety of food when cooked. This 
corresponded to the question we asked in our first experiment, and we framed that 
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experiment as a replication of this earlier study. Thus, our paper acknowledged our debt 
to that work, but also clearly built on this foundation in subsequent studies (e.g., 
Experiments 2-9). Indeed, some questions addressed in our work—such as whether 
chimpanzees can save food (or anything) for the future—are currently under contention 
(Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).  In sum, with the exception of Wobber and colleagues’ 
(2008) study focusing on food preferences, the previous psychological work had not 
asked the question whether chimpanzees (or any other animal) can utilize their existing 
skills in a context that emulates cooking. 
Along the same lines, our focus on chimpanzees in this particular study does not 
mean that only chimpanzees possess this suite of skills. We focused on chimpanzees 
because they are one of our closest living relatives and show many sophisticated 
capacities for future-oriented cognition in other situations (Osvath & Martin-Ordas, 
2014). But as already detailed, we argued that many of the skills needed to cook food are 
domain-general capacities that are not specific to cooking. As such, some of the future-
oriented skills we explored might very well be present in other species as well. For 
example, these capacities might be shared by common descent with the other living great 
apes—or be present in corvids, who exhibit many complex future-oriented behaviors, 
through evolutionary convergence (Emery & Clayton, 2004). The preference for cooked 
foods likely reflects a basic sensitivity to qualities such as sugar or glutamate content, and 
appears to be widely shared (see Carmody, Weintraub, & Wrangham, 2011; Wobber et 
al., 2008; Wrangham, 2009 for discussion).  This sort of evidence does not contradict our 
claims—rather, it provides even stronger phylogenetic support for the hypothesis that 
early hominins also had these capacities.  
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Critique 3: Chimpanzees are not a good model for human evolution 
The final—and in our opinion most provocative—set of claims in Beran and 
colleagues’ commentary concerns the relevance of chimpanzee cognition for 
understanding the emergence of cooking. Beran and colleagues repeatedly express 
puzzlement as to how chimpanzees, who do not naturally cook, could possess any 
cognitive capacities used for the purpose of cooking. We agree there is no reason that 
chimpanzees would have evolved special psychological abilities specific to cooking, but 
this is not what we argued in our paper. As detailed previously, our study focused on a set 
of cognitive pre-requites that are necessary to engage in cooking behaviors, not 
“conceptual knowledge” of cooking itself, let alone some domain-specific cooking 
ability. We proposed that many of the skills needed for cooking are domain-general 
capacities that are likely utilized in other contexts such as foraging. From this 
perspective, it does not seem unreasonable that chimpanzees might exhibit some of these 
skills that happen to be essential pre-requisites for cooking. 
Furthermore, it seems obvious that the first creature who placed food in a fire for 
the first time—whether that creature was Homo erectus or Homo sapiens—could not yet 
have evolved capacities specific to cooking. Importantly, this chicken-or-egg problem in 
understanding the sequential evolution of important traits is not a problem specific to 
cooking. In fact, it stems back to the older concept of ‘pre-adaptation’ and its more recent 
formation of ‘exaptation’ (Gould & Vrba, 1982): the idea that traits which evolved for 
one function can be later co-opted for a new one. When considered from the perspective 
of cooking, we would therefore suggest that the set of cognitive traits we examined most 
likely serve other behavioral functions in nonhumans, and were then co-opted for novel 
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cooking behaviors sometime in the human lineage. Indeed, in our paper we argued that 
“opportunistic use of natural fires—underpinned by the types of cognitive capacities 
examined in the current studies—may have played an important role in bootstrapping the 
emergence of more complex cooking behaviours that required the active control and 
maintenance of fire” (Warneken & Rosati, 2015, page 8)—a point reiterated by Beran et 
al in their commentary. Thus, an important future question is whether such cognitive 
capacities were further refined in human evolution to specifically reflect new cognitive 
challenges posed by the control of fire and dietary dependence on cooked foods.    
Finally, the commentary suggests that our studies are limited by the fact that 
chimpanzees are “not ideal surrogates” (Beran, in press, p. 4) for the last common 
ancestor of human and other apes. In particular, Beran et al. argue that recent fossil 
evidence from Ardipithecus (Lovejoy, 2009) shows that the last common ancestor was 
not chimpanzee-like (or more generally African-ape-like) as previously supposed. 
Lovejoy and colleagues explicitly argue that Ardipithecus invalidates models of human 
origins based on living African apes (see also Sayers & Lovejoy, 2008; Sayers, Raghanti, 
& Lovejoy, 2012 for extended critiques of evolutionary models based on chimpanzees). 
For example, Sayers & Lovejoy (2008) state that “chimpanzee data have been 
consistently misapplied in discussions of human origins and that attempts to account for 
the differentiation of hominids from great apes based on a strict Pan troglodytes model 
cannot succeed” (pp. 87). This view would suggest that comparative studies of behavior 
and cognition in chimpanzees and other living apes are not of any special importance for 
understanding human evolution. We have serious concerns with this conclusion, and we 
are not alone. This claim that an African ape model for the last common ancestor is 
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inaccurate has produced a flurry of critiques from evolutionary scientists, both on 
morphological grounds (e.g., Lieberman, 2013; Wood & Harrison, 2011), as well as for 
the behavioral implications of this claim (McGrew, 2010; Stanford, 2012). In terms of 
cognition specifically, what could replace great apes as a better model for scientists 
interested in testing psychological hypotheses about human evolution? Beran and 
colleagues argue that, for cooking at least, the focus should be on Homo erectus. If we 
had access to a time machine and could conduct psychology experiments with extinct 
hominins, that would undoubtedly be the best option. In the meantime, however, we 
would assert that psychological comparisons of living nonhumans—and especially our 
closest living relatives such as chimpanzees—represent the best bet to understand the 
evolutionary origins of human cognition. 
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